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Exclusive Warranties

(continued from page 67)

ing the Eb/1624 machines. Finally,
the court rejected K & T's breach
of contract counterclaim against
Ragen.
The Third Circuit's Opinion
The Third Circuit reversed the
lower court's holding that Wisconsin state law denied Ragen consequential damages. The court concluded that the exclusive limited
warranties which failed in their
essential purpose, allowed recovery for consequential damages,
even if the contract excluded such
consequential damages. Because K
& T, after extensive effort, could
not repair or replace the machines
to make them perform as warranted, K & T's exclusive warranty
failed in its essential purpose.
Therefore, the court reversed the
district court's decision that Ragen
was not entitled to recover consequential damages, despite explicit
exclusion of such damages in the
warranty. The court remanded the
issue of consequential damages for
retrial.
The Third Circuit then reviewed
the district court's decision to
award Ragen direct damages. The
court stated that in order for Ragen
to recover direct damages, Ragen
must present evidence of losses, on
which a reasonable assessment of
damages may be based. The court
reasoned that this required Ragen
to produce evidence showing the
actual value of the MM800 units it
received and the value of the units
as warranted. Ragen, however, only submitted evidence on (1) the
purchase price of the MM800, (2)
the average up-time of the machines, and (3) the average up-time
of similar machines in the industry. The court decided that this
evidence was insufficient to prove
adequately the actual value of the
MM800. Therefore, the court held
that Ragen was not entitled to
direct damages and accordingly
reversed the district court's decision.
Next, the Third Circuit examined the lower court's rejection of
K & T's counterclaim against Ragen for damages allegedly arising
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from Ragen's cancellation of orders for new machines. The court
decided that the issue required
application of section 2-708(2),
UCC § 2-708(2) (1989), commonly
referred to as the "lost volume
seller" provision. Section 2-708(2)
provides that a seller may recover
lost profits in the event the standard measure of damages is inadequate. The court defined a lost
volume seller as one who could
have sold an item to both the
breaching buyer and a subsequent
buyer; the seller, having made essentially only one rather than two
sales, suffered damage which could
only be remedied by an award for
the amount of lost profits.
The Third Circuit noted that the
fundamental question in applying
the lost volume seller provision
was whether the seller had the
ability to provide the item to the
breaching buyer as well as to the
resale buyer. The court found that,
based on testimony of the case, K
& T, at the time Ragen cancelled
the orders, had more orders for
machines than it could fill. Thus,
the court concluded that K & T
could not have simultaneously
supplied both Ragen and another
buyer; K & T was not a "lost
volume seller." Thus, the court
held that K & T was not entitled to
damages and affirmed the district
court's decision.
Finally, the Third Circuit reviewed the district court's decision
on the Eb/1624 retrofitted machines. The court found that the
district court did not refer to the
Eb/1624s. Instead, the district
court had discussed a retrofitted
MM200, a machine not involved
in the case. Although the court
suspected the district court simply
misnamed the Eb/1624s, it remanded this issue for clarification.
Additionally, since the district
court did not rule on Ragen's fraud
claims, the Third Circuit remanded this issue as well.
Richard E. Nawracaj

Bankruptcy Court Holds
Debtor Responsible For
Obsessive-Compulsive
Use of Credit Card
In In re Borste, 117 Bankr. 995
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1990), the
United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Western District of Washington held that a debtor's credit
card debts were not dischargeable
in bankruptcy even though the
debtor had incurred the obligations while suffering from an obsessive-compulsive disorder which
affected her ability to control her
credit card spending.
Background
Cathy Borste ("Borste"), the
debtor, was a machinist at the
University of Washington. She
earned approximately $26,000 annually. Borste used a combination
of seven credit cards to make at
least ninety-two charges from May
through August 1989, the majority
of which were for luxury items.
Prior to this period, Borste had
difficulty controlling her spending
and meeting her resulting financial
obligations. In May 1989, Borste
owed about $24,000 in secured and
unsecured debt. In June 1989,
Borste sought credit counseling but
was refused assistance. During
credit counseling, however, Borste
had learned that she could declare
personal bankruptcy.
Borste shopped extensively in
the following months. She also
travelled to Europe in early September and returned in mid-October. Upon her return, she consulted an attorney and filed a
Chapter 7 petition on November 7,
1989. Borste owed over $43,000 to
her creditors at the time she filed
for bankruptcy.
Nordstrom, Inc. ("Nordstrom"), a creditor, filed a complaint alleging that thirty-six of the
charges made to Borste's Nordstrom account were not dischargeable. Nordstrom argued that these
charges fell within the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(2)(A)
(1979), because Borste made them
with no intention of paying them.
Thus, the charges had been incurred through fraud, making
them not dischargeable.
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Borste raised the affirmative defense of mental illness, contending
that her credit card use was not
fraudulent because it was an uncontrollable manifestation of her
obsessive-compulsive disorder
("O.C.D."). Consequently, she
claimed, she was unable to formulate the intent required to establish
fraud.
An Objective Test for Intent
The parties agreed that Nordstrom need not show Borste's subjective intent to deceive. Rather,
Nordstrom would have to prove
that Borste exhibited a reckless
disregard for her inability to pay by
continuing to charge items to her
account when she knew or should
have known that she would be
unable to pay for the charges. The
Ninth Circuit had defined this objective standard in In re Dougherty,
84 Bankr. 653 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1988). The Dougherty court had
developed a list of the factors to be
used to determine a debtor's intent
and to determine whether a debtor's credit obligations could be
discharged. The factors considered
included: the sophistication and
financial condition of the debtor,
the nature of the debtor's buying
habits, whether the debtor had
consulted an attorney, and the frequency, timing, and amount of
charges.
Applying the Dougherty factors,
the Borste court found that the
number of charges, thirty-six at
Nordstrom and ninety-two in total,
and the nature of them, most
charges made for luxury items,
were proof of Borste's reckless disregard of her ability to pay when
considered in light of her financial
resources. Borste's net income of
$1,500 to $1,600 per month was
objectively insufficient, according
to the court, to meet her growing
financial obligation to her creditors. At the time of filing for
bankruptcy, Borste owed almost
$30,000 to her consumer creditors
alone. Borste's familiarity with
credit transactions, knowledge of
bankruptcy as an option while she
continued to charge, and sudden
and substantial increase in the
number of charges before filing
demonstrated that she had or
should have had an understanding
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of her inability to pay. Such an
understanding constituted intent
under the law. The court concluded that Borste incurred the charges
with no intent to pay or in reckless
disregard of her inability to do so.
The Defense of Mental Illness
The court noted that a debtor
may rebut a showing of intent in an
action to discharge debt by proving
mental incapacity; however, this
defense failed because the objective standard was so stringent.
Borste's therapist testified that her
O.C.D. manifested itself not in a
lack of comprehension, but in depression and an inability to control
spending. Borste argued that such
manifestations of her O.C.D. took
away her ability to devise intent.
The court found immaterial
Borste's subjective knowledge that
she could not meet the obligations
owed. The court asked instead
whether Borste's O.C.D. rendered
her unable to understand the consequences of her actions and found
that it did not.
The court distinguished Borste's
condition from that of the debtor
in In re Fontenot, 89 Bankr. 575
(Bankr. W.D. La. 1988). In that
case, the debtor successfully argued that his severe manic depression could rebut a showing of a
debtor's fraudulent intent in a similar action for discharge of debt. In
Fontenot, the court found the debtor's mental illness was the direct
cause of both his spending behavior and his unreasonable belief in
his ability to pay his increasing
financial obligations. In contrast,
Borste's belief that she would be
able to pay was based on her past
experience, not on her illness. She
had testified that she thought of
her resources not in terms of her
salary but in terms of her previous
ability to pay, which often depended on her success in obtaining
more credit. The court rejected
Borste's defense of O.C.D. because
Borste failed to prove that she
lacked control of her conduct, let
alone that she was beyond under-standing the consequences of her
behavior.
Credit Card Debt Was Not

Dischargeable
The court expressed sympathy

toward Borste but stopped short of
relieving her of responsibility for
her behavior. The court concluded
that Borste's conduct showed a
reckless disregard for the seriousness of her obligations. After
Borste knew or should have known
that she lacked the ability to pay,
she continued to incur numerous
charges for luxury items on her
Nordstrom and other accounts.
Consequently, Borste's debt to
Nordstrom was not dischargeable
in bankruptcy.
Frank J. Troppe

Trademark Licensor
Held Not Liable To
Indemnify Because It
Did Not Substantially
Participate In The
Production, Marketing,
Or Distribution Of
Defective Product
In Burkert v. PetrolPlus of Naugatuck, Inc., 216 Conn. 65, 579
A.2d 26 (1990), the Supreme Court
of Connecticut examined whether
a distributor of a defective product
was entitled to indemnification by
the licensor of the trademark under
which the defective product was
marketed. The court determined
that the distributor was not entitled to indemnification because the
trademark licensor did not participate in the production, marketing,
or distribution of the product.
Factual Background
General Motors Corporation
("GM") was the trademark licensor of Dexron II, a type of automatic transmission fluid. Through a
licensing program, GM permitted
authorized third parties to use the
Dexron II trademark on transmission fluids meeting GM performance standards. GM did not control the actual contents of the
transmission fluids meeting GM's
performance standards. The contents of transmission fluids produced by GM's licensees were
trade secrets to which GM had no
access. Furthermore, GM received
no royalties or other financial benefits from the licensing program.
(continued on page 70)
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